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Assessing United States (U.S.) past grand strategy is a useful guide 
to gauge foreign policy intentions enabling us to gain vital insights 
to discern the broad pattern of U.S. foreign policy under various 
administrations. Such an approach can be of benefit to the 
academic and policy community giving a sense of the foreign policy 
priorities of the Biden administration particularly with respect to 
the security of Southeast Asia. With this aim in mind, our article 
employs a variation of the analytical framework employed in the 
field of foreign policy evaluation to examine the possible options 
for U.S. Grand Strategy. At the risk of oversimplification, it selects 
and assesses four samples of U.S. Grand Strategy alternatives: 
isolationism, offshore balancing, selective engagement, and deep 
engagement. Next we focus on recent events to assess which 
pattern of Grand Strategy best describes the Biden administration’s 
foreign policy stance. Our aim is that these insights will help 
regional actors to anticipate and respond accordingly to the Biden 




The U.S. has faced significant challenges in recent years yet it still remains the 
preeminent country in the world. No other power comes close to matching its 
dominance in economic, military, diplomatic, financial, technological and 
cultural realms. Without a doubt, the options adopted by President Biden as he 
charts a new foreign course for his country will resonate with the rest of the world 
especially the Asian region. 
While putting its domestic house in order by trying to reign in partisan 
divides nurtured by his predecessor Donald Trump and his poor handling of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, President Biden is addressing his country’s fight against 
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the pandemic and thereby keeping its economic recovery on course. As a 
safeguard, a USD1.9 trillion stimulus is now in place to sustain the recovery.  
More importantly, and for the purposes of this article, the U.S. has re-
engaged international affairs after four years of his predecessor’s America First 
strategy. The U.S. is back in the World Health Organisation (WHO), re-entered 
the Paris climate accords and aims to cooperate in the strengthening of the World 
Trade Organisation. Critically, the Biden Administration wants to ratchet up the 
pressure on its rivals China and Russia. There is a greater emphasis on improved 
ties with Asia and Europe with talk of a reinvigorated western alliance and a 
desire to give higher priority to Asian policy. We do not expect that the foreign 
policy road ahead to be smooth sailing. This is really the honeymoon phase for 
the Biden administration. In the foreign policy arena, some element of 
coordination between China and Russia will keep the U.S. off balance. Tests of 
the administration’s resolve will almost certainly come from Iran and North 
Korea as these countries destabilise the strategic equation in their respective 
regions. With that context as the backdrop, how will Biden administration’s grand 
strategy evolve and what will be the implications for Southeast Asia? Answering 
this question will be the objective of this article. 
 
Understanding Grand Strategy 
Grand strategy is one of those timeless concepts regularly examined within the 
International Relations (IR) literature dating back from the pre-Cold War era.1 As 
an approach used to achieve long-term objectives, grand strategy represents the 
                                                 
1 The history of the concept is perhaps at best murky. The concept appeared to gain prominence within the 
history and political science literature since the Second World War. See Edward Mead Earle, 
"Introduction," in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1943); Bernard Brodie, "Strategy as a Science," World Politics 1, no. 4 (1949). For a 
more recent contribution, see John Lewis Gaddis, On Grand Strategy (New York: Penguin, 2018); 
Richard K. Betts, "The Grandiosity of Grand Strategy," The Washington Quarterly 42, no. 4 (2019); David 
Gethin Morgan-Owen, "History and the Perils of Grand Strategy," The Journal of Modern History 92, no. 
2 (2020); Thierry Balzacq and Ronald R. Krebs, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Grand Strategy (Oxford 
University Press, 2021). 
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highest level of planning on how any sitting government intends to secure its 
nation using various foreign policy tools in its arsenal. In addition, the policy and 
academic discussions on grand strategy predominantly revolve around the 
experience of great power, notably the U.S.2 Moreover, assessing the grand 
strategy produces important insights that are useful to learn and to estimate the 
pattern of a particular country’s goals, means, and commitments that shape its 
overall foreign policy. 
Momentum to continue the discussion on U.S. grand strategy has arguably 
been reignited with the inauguration of Joseph Biden as the U.S. 46th President. 
In the run-up to the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election, Joe Biden as the Democratic 
Party’s nominee for the presidency outlined his campaign promises that relate to 
America’s foreign policy and its role in international politics.3 However, the 
newly elected President Biden now faces a more tenuous situation – both at home 
and abroad – compared to when President Donald Trump came into office four 
years ago. Around the globe, perceptions are strong that the U.S. is declining as 
a global influence with imminent challenges from both competitors and 
adversaries, and a society at home that is deeply polarised. 
Within weeks into his administration, President Biden enacted an Interim 
National Security Strategic Guidance as the major policy guideline to address 
pressing challenges.4 Whether the Interim National Security document becomes 
                                                 
2 To quote a few, prominent sample includes George Keenan’s famous long telegram to Hal Brand’s 
assessment on Trump’s grand strategy. See George F. Keenan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign 
Affairs 25, no. 4 (1947); Hal Brands, American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings, 2018). 
3 See Joseph R. Biden Jr., "Why America Must Lead Again: Rescuing U.S. Foreign Policy After Trump," 
Foreign Affairs 99 (2020), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-
america-must-lead-again. 
4 See Joseph R. Biden Jr., Interim National Security Strategic Guidance,  (Washington, D.C.: The White 
House, 2021). Commentaries discussing Biden’s INSS Guidance, see Richard Fontaine et al., "CNAS 
Responds: Assessing Biden's Interim National Security Strategy," news release, 5 March, 2021, 
https://www.cnas.org/press/press-note/cnas-responds-assessing-bidens-interim-national-security-strategy; 
Abhijnan Rej, "Biden’s New Strategic Guidance: Squaring the Circle?," The Diplomat (5 March 2021). 
https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/bidens-new-strategic-guidance-squaring-the-circle/; Daniel W. 
Drezner, "Let’s grade the Biden administration’s interim strategic guidance," The Washington Post (9 March 
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another metaphorical “Christmas Tree” of U.S. foreign policy, or a meaningful 
guideline depends on how President Biden engages the world over the course of 
the second half of 2021. At the very least, the guideline will serve to consolidate 
the Biden administration’s authority over foreign policy, reorient the domestic 
support, and assure the reversal of Trump’s unsettling legacy.5 More importantly, 
the guideline translates President Biden’s campaign promises into a coherent plan 
to reaffirm U.S. commitments to global initiatives and reclaim America’s role as 
a “responsible” global leader.  
Against this backdrop, this article asks the following questions: Based on 
the pattern of U.S. grand strategy alternatives, how will the Biden 
administration’s foreign policy engage Southeast Asia? To answer this question, 
this article proceeds with the aim of addressing two tasks. It first analyses a 
possible set of U.S. grand strategy alternatives using an analytical framework 
outlined in the subsequent section. Second, it provides a preliminary assessment 
on whether President Biden’s campaign vision and his actual foreign policy 
within the first few months fit into any discernible patterns as postulated in these 
grand strategy alternatives. The article though recognises two limitations. First, 
the assessment of U.S. grand strategy alternatives runs the risk of 
oversimplification.6 Second, the article acknowledges limitations in our analysis 
as this can only be a preliminary assessment on the ground that the Biden 
administration has only been in office since January 2021. 
                                                 
2021). https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/03/08/lets-grade-biden-administrations-interim-
strategic-guidance/. 
5 Some of President Trump’s unsettling legacies – as some analysts have pointed out – include the present 
U.S. polarised society and challenging civil-military relations. See Matt Spetalnick et al., "Analysis: 
Trump's legacy: A more divided America, a more unsettled world," Reuters  (2021), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-trump-legacy-analysis-int-idUSKBN29P0EX. Jim Golby and 
Peter A. Feaver, "Biden Inherits a Challenging Civil-Military Legacy," War on the Rocks  (2021), 
https://warontherocks.com/2021/01/biden-inherits-a-challenging-civil-military-legacy/. 
6 The risk of oversimplification is within reasonable limit, considering that a grand strategy might represent 
the actual day-to-day strategic interaction. For another article acknowledging such risk see Stephen M. 
Walt, "The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing U.S. Grand Strategy," International Security 14, no. 1 
(1989): 6. 
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This article proceeds in the following manner. First, it starts by outlining 
the analytical framework by assessing different grand strategy alternatives. 
Following such a framework, the article then examines four samples of U.S. 
Grand Strategy alternatives: (neo)isolationism, offshore balancing, selective 
engagement, and deep engagement. Then, it puts forward a preliminary 
assessment of the Biden administration’s foreign policy as observed from its first 
five months in office. The article concludes with reflection points targeted for both 
U.S. foreign policy observers and Southeast Asian policymakers. 
 
Analytical Framework: Key Variables in Assessing Grand Strategy 
Alternatives. 
Assessing grand strategy has become a regular exercise within the fields of 
Political Science, IR, and even History – particularly among U.S academia – 
which resulted in the need for us to delve into various existing analytical 
frameworks.7 This article contends that grand strategy can also be framed as a 
form of foreign policy output – albeit on a larger scale – and therefore can be 
assessed as a framework for policy evaluation.8 Despite the differences, this article 
finds common criteria shared by the perspectives of Walt and Mearshimer and 
those of Baldwin. These criteria include: (1) limited or expanded definition of 
national objectives and vital interest; (2) the prescription that limits or allows the 
means and cost of conducting foreign policy to achieve such vital interest; and lastly 
(3) the stake or willingness in conducting such policy and accepting the costs that it 
entail. 
                                                 
7 Prominent contemporary thinkers on American Grand Strategy include Hal Brands, Richard K. Betts, 
Anne Marie Slaughter, Robert Art, Stephen Walt, John Mearsheimer, and others. See Brands, American 
Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump; Betts, "The Grandiosity of Grand Strategy."; Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
The Chessboard and the Web: Strategies of Connection in a Networked World (New Haven, C.N.: Yale 
University Press, 2017); Robert J. Art, A Grand Strategy for America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2003); John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. 
Grand Strategy," Foreign Affairs 95, no. 4 (2016). 
8 An example of tools for evaluating foreign policy, see David A. Baldwin, "Success and Failure in Foreign 
Policy," Annual Review of Political Science 3 (2000). 
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Definition of National Objectives and Vital Interest. A grand strategy – like any 
other policy – is oriented towards achieving national objectives which more likely 
includes the plan to secure vital interest. Hence, the first point to assess concerns 
whether a grand strategy identifies and states the scope of these vital interests. 
Three propositions are used in assessing the scope of objectives and vital interest: 
whether the grand strategy defines limited or expanded vital interest; whether the 
strategy intends to stimulate short term or long term change over its policy targets; 
and whether the strategy risks negative or positive impacts regarding its overall 
objective and vital interest.9 
The Scope of Means and Cost. The second point of assessment involves the 
means and cost that are likely to be incurred with the grand strategy alternatives. 
Any policy calculation needs to be accompanied by a balanced cost rationale: 
whether the cost is feasible for the user and whether such costs could generate the 
overall net achievement.10 In addition, the cost calculation on grand strategy 
alternatives should also consider the likely strategic interaction between the user 
and its adversary or competitors as a policy target. Any grand strategy that could 
increase the likely cost imposed to the adversary or competitor – valued in both 
material and nonmaterial cost – is considered effective.11 
The Stake and Willingness. The last point of assessment involves the stakes 
and willingness of both the policy user and the policy target. Assessing the stakes 
and willingness involves estimating the level of domestic public support towards 
                                                 
9 This point is inspired from David Baldwin’s article which acknowledges Robert Dahl’s argument that 
policy may also produce a negative effect in terms of goal attainment. See Baldwin, "Success and Failure 
in Foreign Policy."; Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," Behavioral Science 2 (1957).. 
10 This point is also taken from Baldwin which quoted Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom in arguing that 
any policy should be rationally designed to maximize the net goal achievement to the extend it is also 
efficient. See Politics, Economics, and Welfare: Planning and Politico-Economic Systems Resolved into Basic 
Social Processes (Chicago, I.L.: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 38-9.. 
11 Again, foreign policy evaluation advises to look at the likely cost imposed to the target in the overall 
calculation of cost-effectiveness. See "Success and Failure in Foreign Policy," 175; Robert A. Pape, 
Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), 197; 
Thomas C. Schelling, Choice and Consequence: Perspectives of an Errant Economist (Cambridge, M.A.: 
Harvard University Press, 1984), 274; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven, C.T.: Yale 
University Press, 1981), 90.. 
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the given grand strategy: whether its definition on objectives and vital interest are 
palatable for domestic public support. It is more likely that domestic support for 
a particular foreign policy has a negative correlation value with the foreign policy 
commitment. Meaning that every time the government expands its foreign policy 
commitment – which in most cases involves military deployments – domestic 
public support usually dwindles. In addition, like the second criteria, assessing the 
stakes and willingness over its policy target requires understanding the likely 
strategic interactions. Some type of grand strategy might induce the target country 
to harden its domestic resolve. 
 
 
Figure 1. Framework in Assessing Grand Strategy. 
Source: Author’s design. 
 
All in all, these three points are best summarized in the figure above. The 
article now proceeds in assessing the U.S. grand strategy alternatives in the 
following section. 
 
U.S. Grand Strategy Alternatives: Neo-Isolationism to Global Engagement 
This section analyses the four U.S. grand strategy alternatives. As previously 
mentioned, the four U.S. grand strategy alternatives to be assessed are: neo-
isolationism, offshore balancing, selective engagement, and deep engagement. 
We have opted for these four alternatives based on two reasons.12 First, these 
                                                 
12 In a 1996 International Security article, Barry Posen and Andrew Ross have discussed three of these 
alternatives: Neo-Isolationism, Selective Engagement, and Primacy (or Deep Engagement). For a 
Framework in Assessing Grand 
Strategy Alternatives
Scope of National Objectives and 
Vital Interest
Limited or Expansive?
Means and Cost of Following Grand 
Strategy Prescription
User: Feasibility and Effectiveness
Target: Prohibitive or Non 
Prohibitive Cost
The Stake and Willingness
User: Domestic Support over the 
Strategy
Target: Resolve in Countering the 
Strategy
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grand strategy alternatives have emerged on various occasions as a potential 
replacement for the U.S. containment grand strategy (or strategies, if you will) 
during the Cold War. Second, these alternatives – and their advocates – 
adequately address U.S. vital interests and elaborate the means to achieve such 
interests according to each theoretical and empirical underpinning. The article 
then proceeds with a brief description of the main tenets of these grand strategy 
alternatives. 
Neo-isolationism. The main assumption of the (neo)-isolationism (or 
disengagement if you will) revolves around the belief that the U.S. has little 
security interests beyond its borders.13 The advocates of neo-isolationism define 
American vital interest as “the security, liberty, and property of American 
people”14 and believe that threats to those vital interests are at best modest. As a 
result, advocates of neo-isolationism tend to deem any form of U.S. overseas 
commitment counterproductive and unnecessary. In a recent times, authors have 
contended whether the Trump administration’s “America First” doctrine has 
some roots in this isolationism tradition in U.S. foreign policy.15 Nevertheless, 
isolationism and its newer forms have reserved their place as one of the U.S. grand 
strategy alternatives. 
Offshore Balancing. The second grand strategy alternative is in 
contemporary times one of the most popular alternatives among U.S. academics. 
Its proponents – John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt – argue that offshore 
                                                 
detailed discussion, see Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand 
Strategy," International Security 21, no. 3 (1996): 6. The idea of offshore balancing was coined relatively 
at the same time but has seen more vigour recently. See Mearsheimer and Walt, "The Case for Offshore 
Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy." 
13 Walt, "The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing U.S. Grand Strategy," 7. Walt summarises the traits 
of Neo-Isolationism by listing down its advocates which among others includes Earl Ravenal, NATO: 
The Tides of Discontent (Berkeley, C.A.: Institute of International Studies, 1985); Laurence Radway, "Let 
Europe Be Europe," World Policy Journal 1, no. 1 (1983); Eric A. Nordlinger, Isolationism Reconfigured: 
American Foreign Policy for a New Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995). 
14 The passage is borrowed from Doug Bandow, "Keeping the Troops and the Money at Home," Current 
History 93, no. 579 (1994): 10. 
15 Barry R. Posen, "The Rise of Illiberal Hegemony: Trump's Suprising Grand Strategy," Foreign Affairs 97 
(2018); Charles A. Kupchan, Isolationism: A History of America’s Efforts to Shield Itself From the World 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020). 
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balancing may become a superior grand strategy alternative because it could set 
reasonable limits on U.S. foreign policy goals as well as the means to achieve it.16 
Pertaining to U.S. vital interest, Mearsheimer and Walt argue that it needs to 
include other regions that are crucial for the U.S. economy – particularly those 
which are industrialized like Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Middle East. In 
addition, it differs from the “selective engagement” approach – which advocates 
a U.S. military presence in those three regions. The advocates of offshore 
balancing argue that the U.S. would only need to deploy its military forces in 
cases where its allies are unable to balance against the regional hegemon. 
Selective Engagement. Theoretically, selective engagement is situated – 
based on the level of U.S. foreign policy commitment alone – at a midway point 
between the grand strategy of isolationism and deep engagement. Its proponent, 
Robert J. Art, starts from the assumption that an alternative grand strategy must 
be able to set limits on U.S. foreign policy objectives.17 Like offshore balancing, 
Art defines U.S. interests in broader terms than advocates of isolationism grand 
strategy, yet Art’s approach is more limited than deep engagement which he calls 
a strategy of dominion. However, unlike Mearsheimer and Walt, Art believes that 
the U.S would require to have a forward deployment stance in Eurasia and the 
Middle East to secure those vital interests. As a consequence, prescribing selective 
engagement may cost the U.S. more in terms of sustaining the need for a military 
presence in those areas. In defending this particular policy choice, Art argues that 
having a forward-deployed military is cheaper rather than hastily deploying one 
in an emergency situation. In addition, a U.S. military presence in those regions 
also would deter likely adversaries and competitors. 
Deep Engagement. Deep engagement (or Primacy and Dominion) perhaps is 
an alternative that brings with it an avalanche of criticism due to its highly 
ambitious nature.18 Administrations that adhere to this grand strategy tend to 
                                                 
16 Mearsheimer and Walt, "The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy." 
17 Art, A Grand Strategy for America. 
18 The proponents of the above-mentioned grand strategy alternatives point out each and their own 
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define American national interest in the broadest terms – to maintain U.S. 
supremacy – and oftentimes seek to define the world in its image. To achieve such 
goals, the advocates of deep engagement or primacy tend to prescribe a wide array 
of policies designed to outdistance any global competitors militarily, 
economically, and politically.19 In addition, due to its prohibitive cost, adopting 
such a grand strategy option is hard to defend in the face of the domestic public 
accountability. Such a grand strategy may also invite a reaction from U.S. 
adversaries or competitors risking blowback, and with it, greater risks. 
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criticism towards this approach, with most calling it unfeasible due to its extremely costly nature which 
may lead to – as historian Paul Kennedy termed – imperial overstretch. See Paul Kennedy, The Rise and 
Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (London: Random House, 
1987). 
19 Posen and Ross describe the advocates of primacy tend to believe that U.S. would need to preclude any 
rising competitors and challengers. See Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," 
32-3. 
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Source: Authors’ design based on the article’s framework. 
 
To provide a comparison, these four grand strategies are summarised 
through the above table based on the criteria outlined in the earlier section. Based 
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on the information provided above, this article now embarks on estimating the 
Biden administration’s foreign policy and assesses where it fits into the pattern of 
these alternatives. 
 
The Promise of President Biden’s Grand Strategy? 
The inauguration of President Biden provided an opportunity for his policy team 
to undertake a fresh assessment of foreign policy and how it would look like as 
planners sought to distance the administration from the Trump era. To analyse 
the case of Biden’s foreign policy, this section proceeds in the following manner. 
First, it would assess whether Biden’s campaign promises and the issued policy 
document present: (1) a distinguishable list of priorities that would serve as U.S. 
vital interest; (2) a cost rationale on the means of achieving the vital interest; and 
(3) a pattern of foreign policy commitment that depends on U.S. domestic public 
support. Second, this section assesses whether Biden’s actual foreign policies align 
with his rhetoric on issues about (1) global competitors and adversaries, as well 
as (2) the Southeast Asia region. 
Upon its inauguration, the Biden-Harris administration faced three 
imminent challenges on the foreign policy front: it suffered from declining 
influence across the globe, an imminent challenge from a rising China, and deeply 
polarised domestic politics. Within days into his administration, President Biden 
has come up with an Interim National Security Strategic Guidance that 
represented his political commitment to return the U.S. position as a trusted 
global leader and to repair its commitment towards its allies. According to the 
document, the Biden administration defines U.S. national interest by outlining 
the following priorities: “(1) …to protect the security of the American people. (2) … 
interest in expanding economic prosperity and opportunity. (3) … realizing and defending 
the democratic values at the heart of the American way of life.”20 Following such 
delimitations on what constitutes vital interests, the document also stated a set of 
                                                 
20 Biden Jr., Short Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, 9. 
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means, the priority in using foreign policy tools, and the level of commitment to 
each key issue. Overall, the document speaks about the Biden administration’s 
intention and willingness to go down the pattern of a deep engagement grand 
strategy, though in a more considered manner. 
Hence there is an element of ambiguity over policy direction. This begs the 
question, what exactly is Biden’s actual foreign policy? Soon after enacting the 
Interim National Security Strategy, the Biden administration started to take on 
global competitors – both China and Russia alike. On 18-19 March 2021, in its 
first foray, the administration engaged in official talks with China in Anchorage, 
Alaska. On the American side, the meeting was attended by Secretary of State 
Anthony Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan; while the Chinese 
side was represented by Member of the Politburo and the highest-ranking foreign 
policy official, Yang Jiechi and Foreign Minister Wang Yi. The talks which 
included discussions on sensitive topics including the repression of the Uyghur 
community in Xinjiang and Taiwan’s security, led to an exchange of “angry 
words” rather than a productive discussion conducive for global stability.21 
Regarding U.S.-Russia relations, President Biden decided to impose sanctions for 
its alleged involvement in a cyberattack on SolarWinds’s networks. Russian 
authorities though have denied all allegations of their involvement with the 
cyberattack.22  
Those two episodes illustrate that the Biden administration will not hold 
back from using more coercive instruments when addressing the challenge posed 
by its global competitors. Yet the pattern of U.S. foreign policy commitment 
remains inconclusive without including other regions and in this context 
analysing foreign policy actions in the Middle East, South Asia, and other regions 
of critical importance. For example, the Biden administration maintains a strong 
                                                 
21 "US and China Trade Angry Words at High-Level Alaska Talks," BBC News, 19 March 2021, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-56452471. 
22 "US imposes sanctions on Russia over cyber-attacks," BBC News, 16 April 2021, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-56755484. 
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U.S. commitment to the security of Israel as evidenced in its response to recent 
conflict there at the cost of displaying what some have described as an inability to 
act decisively as a “good referee” in the conflict between Israel and Hamas.23 In 
addition, President Biden had also signalled his plans to end the American 
military deployment in Afghanistan, a decision that has divided Capitol Hill.24   
If these two cases connect well with America’s interest, how about the 
issues in a region with lesser impact on American vital interests? Consider 
Southeast Asia: the “hypothetical” ground zero for U.S.-China rivalry. Despite 
increasing Chinese maritime activity in the South China Sea and a military coup 
in Myanmar, the Biden administration response and attention towards Southeast 
Asian has been muted. With regard to the human rights agenda, the Biden 
administration only placed economic sanctions on the Tatmadaw junta leaders 
who had perpetrated the coup in Myanmar.25 In addition, despite all the hype, the 
Biden administration first formal diplomatic talks with ASEAN ministers was 
something of a damp squib.26 Perhaps President Biden’s indication that he is ready 
to engage with Southeast Asian leaders in the latter half of this year portends 
better outcomes for the region. 
In sum, it is fair to say that the Biden administration’s actual foreign policy 
probably fits into the larger pattern of the selective engagement grand strategy. With 
U.S. energies and attention focused on taming its global competitors, regions like 
Southeast Asia perhaps only serves as a sideshow in American foreign policy. 
President Biden’s actual foreign policy – in reality is merely the use of deep 
engagement rhetoric – remains poor in its demonstration effect and gives the 
                                                 
23 Ian Bremmer, "The Ceasefire Between Israel and Hamas Shows How Little Control Biden Has Over the 
Middle East," TIME (23 May 2021). https://time.com/6050609/ceasefire-israel-hamas-biden/. 
24 "Lawmakers Divided Over Biden’s Plan to Withdraw All Troops from Afghanistan by Sept. 11," The 
New York Times, 25 April 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/04/13/us/biden-news-today. 
25 "Biden Imposes Sanctions on Generals Who Engineered Myanmar Coup," The New York Times, 10 
February 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/10/us/politics/biden-sanctions-myanmar-
coup.html. 
26 Colum Lynch, Jack Detsch, and Robbie Gramer, "The Glitch That Ruined Blinken’s ASEAN Debut," 
Foreign Policy (27 May 2021). https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/27/blinken-asean-meeting-pivot-asia-
middle-east/. 
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impression that Southeast Asia policy is a continuation of Trump era policy and 
by that extension the region remains one characterised by lower commitment 
similar to areas of lesser value for U.S. vital interests. 
 
Conclusion: Anticipating the implication of Biden’s Grand Strategy on 
Southeast Asia 
This article has compared and analysed the four U.S. grand strategy alternatives 
in the post-Cold War setting. It also has analysed President Biden’s foreign policy 
promises and practice in the early days of the administration. Out of the four 
alternatives, Biden’s campaign promises demonstrate that he would go down the 
path of a deep engagement grand strategy, albeit in a more considered manner. 
However, preliminary assessment of actual foreign policy paints a different 
picture highlighting that Biden’s commitment was lesser than what he intended: 
President Biden would appear to walk the path of selective engagement, with less 
attention to regions that do not fall into the realm of vital interests. 
For Southeast Asian countries, this pattern could have two interpretations. 
First, because the Biden administration would seem to focus on taming global 
competitors, Southeast Asian countries would not need to worry about regional 
stability and could retain their strategic space. Due to changes in tone and tenor 
of U.S.-China engagement – as compared to the Trump presidency – it could be 
safe to presume that the Biden administration will engage China more cautiously 
and any ripple effects will not overtly change the strategic dynamic. Second, 
precisely because the U.S. has maintained its focus on taming global competitors, 
Southeast Asian countries can focus on finding new avenues for cooperation 
without the need to worry about external interference. Overall, Southeast Asian 
countries should be able to anticipate the Biden administration’s likely pattern of 
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